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(54) **DETERMINING VALIDITY OF LOCATION SIGNAL COMBINATIONS FOR SECURING UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) NAVIGATION**

G05D 1/101 (2013.01); **H04W 4/027** (2013.01); **B64C 2201/141** (2013.01); **B64D 2045/0055** (2013.01); **G08G 5/0069** (2013.01)

(58) **Field of Classification Search**

None
See application file for complete search history.

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(73) Assignee: **Fortinet, INC**, Sunnyvale, CA (US)

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G01S 13/00	(2006.01)
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G01S 19/21	(2010.01)
G01S 13/87	(2006.01)
G08G 5/00	(2006.01)

(57) **ABSTRACT**


A navigation security module of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) receives a combination of signals from a location technology, each signal comprising at least a signal identification and location data. The combination of signal identifications is processed against known identifications. If the identification is not found, or if the combination of signal identification is not possible, the signal may be a rogue signal, resulting in a quarantine protocol.

(52) **U.S. Cl.**

CPC **B64D 45/0015** (2013.01); **B64C 39/024** (2013.01); **G01S 13/878** (2013.01); **G01S 19/13** (2013.01); **G01S 19/215** (2013.01);

20 Claims, 7 Drawing Sheets

300






FIG. 1A




FIG. 1B




FIG. 2

300




FIG. 3

330




FIG. 4

340




FIG. 5




FIG. 6

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**DETERMINING VALIDITY OF LOCATION
SIGNAL COMBINATIONS FOR SECURING
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV)
NAVIGATION**

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The invention relates generally to computer security, and more specifically, to determining the validity of location signal combinations for securing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) navigation.

BACKGROUND

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, aircraft without a human pilot aboard. Some drones are controlled by a remote control of a pilot on the ground, while others fly autonomously. Long range drones typically fly autonomously outside of the range possible for remote controls. In order to navigate to a specific destination, drones can receive location signals (e.g., GPS, cell towers, or access points) and use an onboard computer to determine a current position based on the signal using triangulation or other techniques. Current location, trajectory, and destination locations can all be taken into account for making steering adjustments.

However, these unmanned flights are vulnerable to attack by rogue location signals. For example, GPS is an open system that can be with known signatures that can faked in a spurious signal injected with bad location information. As a result, drones can be misdirected.

What is needed is a robust technique for securing UAV navigation by detecting rogue location signals. The solution can quarantine UAVs that have been compromised.

SUMMARY

The above-mentioned shortcomings are addressed by a navigation security system onboard a UAV for determining the validity of combinations of location signals.

In one embodiment, a navigation security module of a UAV receives a combination of signals from a location technology, each signal comprising at least a signal identification and location data. In an embodiment, the combination of signal identifications is processed against known identifications. If the identification is not found, or if the combination of signal identification is not possible, the signal may be a rogue signal. Heuristics-based techniques can also identify rogue signals.

In another embodiment, a combination of RSSI values are processed against known possible RSSI values for a given combination. Each signal can have an RSSI value representing signal strength which attenuates over distance. If the combination of RSSI values is not possible for the identified signals, the combination of signals can be invalidated.

In still another embodiment, a compromised UAV is quarantined. For example, the UAV can be safely landed at the next available opportunity. The UAV can ignore the comprised signals and use validated signals, such as the last validated signals, to find navigate to the landing location.

Advantageously, UAVs can avoid rogue location signals and compromised flight paths.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In the following drawings, like reference numbers are used to refer to like elements. Although the following figures

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depict various examples of the invention, the invention is not limited to the examples depicted in the figures.

FIG. 1A is a high-level block diagram illustrating a navigation security system for determining validity of satellite location signal combinations, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 1B is a high-level block diagram illustrating a navigation security system for determining validity of access point or cell tower location signal combinations, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 2 is a more detailed block diagram illustrating a navigation security module of the system of FIG. 1, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 3 is a high-level flow chart illustrating a method for determining validity of location signal combinations, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 4 is a more detailed flow chart illustrating a step of analyzing location signal combinations of the method of FIG. 3, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 5 is a more detailed flow chart illustrating a step of quarantining an autonomous UAV flight of the method of FIG. 3, according to an embodiment.

FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary computing device, according to one embodiment.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Hand-off control systems, computer-implemented methods, and (non-transitory) computer-readable mediums for navigation security onboard a UAV to determine the validity of combinations of location signals.

Systems for UAV Navigation Security (FIGS. 1-2)

FIG. 1A is a high-level block diagram illustrating a navigation security system **100A** for determining validity of satellite location signal combinations, according to an embodiment. The system **100A** comprises a UAV **110AA**, location satellites **120A-C**, and rogue device **130**. The UAV **110A** receives wireless location signals from the satellites **120A-C**, and also from the rogue device **130**. Additional components can also be part of the system **100A**, such as additional UAVs, additional satellites, and other components. The system **100A** components can be implemented as hardware, software, or a combination of both.

The UAV **110A** further comprises a navigation security module **115** to provide navigation security during autonomous flights. Therefore, as the UAV **110A** traverses through a flight path using combinations of location signals at certain time to determine a current location and trajectory and in order to make necessary adjustments. Flights can be fully or partially autonomous. Security threats can be from the rogue device **130** or other components sending location signals that threaten a flight path. In one embodiment, responsive to detecting an invalid combination of location signals, the navigation security module **115** is able to quarantine a spurious location signal, or the UAV **110A** from being further compromised.

For example, a product delivery service can use drones to automatically fly to a customer home and delivery a product. The drone is pre-programmed before take off to a specific flight path starting at a distribution center, landing at a customer home, and returning to the distribution center. During a leg of the flight path, a rogue satellite, access point, or cell tower signal can be used to disrupt the flight path or even to intercept the drone. Once the attack is detected, the drone can use the last location to estimate a return flight path

or to make an emergency landing, for example. Drones can also be used for military, monitoring, weather observation, or any many other purposes.

The UAV **110A** can be, for example a drone (e.g., by Parrot Inc.), an RC airplane, a quadcopter, an unmanned aircraft system (UAS), a remotely piloted aerial vehicle (RPAV), a remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS), or any other flying device without a human pilot aboard. One embodiment of a drone includes a body, a power supply (e.g., lithium-polymer battery), an onboard computer (e.g. see FIG. 6), sensors (e.g., proprioceptive or exteroceptive sensors), actuators (e.g., propeller RPM controllers), software (e.g., real-time autopilot software), flight controls (e.g., lower layer control similar to manned aviation), and communications (e.g., antennae and wireless radio). The navigation security module **115** can be implemented by the onboard computer. An example of embodiment of the navigation security module **115** is set forth in more detail below in FIG. 2. An example of the onboard computer is discussed with respect to FIG. 6. Many other variations are possible.

The satellites **120** are preferably GPS satellites (e.g., 24 satellite constellation), in the current embodiment. Of course, other embodiments are implementable with different location or position technology. The GPS embodiment can be a NAVSTAR GPS satellite. The satellites **120** can be spaced-based, circling the Earth at an altitude of 12,000 miles or so. Positioning based on GPS typically relies upon four measurements, called trilateration: the first isolate a current location to a sphere, a second to narrow the current location to a circle, a third satellite reduces the circle to two possible points, and a fourth satellite selects between the two possible points and helps calculate timing. Other forms of position determination include triangulation which uses the measurement of absolute angles, trilateration discussed above, multilateration, or the like.

The navigation security module **115** identifies specific GPS satellites from identifications embedded within transmitted location signals. For instance, space vehicle numbers (SVNs) are serial numbers assigned to each GPS satellite, and pseudo-random noise sequences (PRNs) also differentiate satellites. The PRN codes can be a coarse acquisition (i.e., C/A code) or precision (P-code). The identifications are a stream of binary digits.

More generally, GPS satellites transmit two low power radio signals, designated L1 and L2. Civilian GPS uses the L1 frequency of 1,575.42 MHz in the UHF band and uses the L2 frequency of 1,227.60 MHz, at varying modulations to reduce interference. The signals travel by line of sight, meaning they will pass through clouds, glass and plastic but will not go through most solid objects such as buildings and mountains. There are 24 GPS satellites, on 6 orbital planes that orbit at 20 kilometers altitude.

The rogue device **130** can be an unauthorized satellite or other unauthorized computing device simulating the behavior of the satellites **120**. In an embodiment, the rogue device **130** transmits a certain identification of an authorized satellite. Utilizing techniques described herein, the rogue device **130** is detected based on characteristics such as RSSI and expected location. The rogue device **130** can be operated by, for example, a hacker, a thief, a security administrator, or other individual or process.

FIG. 1B is a high-level block diagram illustrating a navigation security system **100B** for determining validity of access point, cell tower, or RFID tag location signal combinations, according to an embodiment. A Wi-Fi based system can utilize signals over a IEEE 802.11 type of wireless network.

In contrast to the system **100A** which relies upon satellites for positioning, the system **100B** relies upon access points for positioning. More particularly, the system **100B** comprises a UAV **110B** communication with access points **121** in place of satellites **120**. Alternatively, cell towers or other location devices can be implemented. The system **100B** further comprises network **199** and a UAV server **140**.

In an embodiment, the access points **121** have overlapping wireless coverage areas. The UAV **110** is configured with a Wi-Fi receiver rather than a satellite receiver. A first embodiment, extracts one or more BSSIDs from a beacon transmitted periodically to advertise a presence of the access points **121**. The BSSID is converted to a search query to determine a location of the associated access point in order to estimate the UAV **110B** location. As shown in FIG. 1B, location L1 provides a location from a single access point. Meanwhile, location L2 provides a more accurate location from two access points and location L3 provides the most accurate location from three access points. In one embodiment, the UAV **110** switches to different navigation modes based on how a number of access points within range. Some actions may be restricted from a navigation mode based on a single access point due to lack of available accuracy.

Conventionally, wireless stations respond to beacons as part of a protocol for authentication for the purpose of using the access points **121** to send and receive information over a wired network backbone. Because the access points **121** just need a BSSID as an identifier, authentication is not necessary in some embodiments. In other embodiments, the UAV **110B** authenticates in order to communicate with the UAV server **140** or other data resource. One purpose of authenticating is to find out a location associated with an access point if not preconfigured in an onboard database.

FIG. 2 is a more detailed block diagram illustrating the navigation security module **115** (abstractly representing **115A** and **115B**), according to an embodiment. The navigation security module **115** of the present embodiment comprises a GPS signal receiver **210**, a GPS satellite database **220**, a signal location analyzer **230**, and a quarantine module **240**. Each of the components are implementable in hardware and/or software.

In one embodiment, the GPS signal receiver **210** comprises a GPS receiver that converts electromagnetic energy into a current. In more detail, a sequential GPS receiver can track GPS satellites using one or two hardware channels. Tracking one satellite at a time, the GPS receiver time tags measurements and combines them when all four satellite pseudo ranges have been measured. The signal receiver **210** can be a single-frequency code receiver, a single-frequency carrier-smoothed code receiver, a single-frequency code and carrier receiver, or a dual-frequency receiver.

The GPS satellite database **220** can be implemented as a simple list, a spreadsheet, a sequential database, or the like. Each GPS satellite includes an identification and an expected location. In some cases, the location is a function of time. The GPS satellite database **220** can be updated between flights or during flights through a data communication channel. In some cases, the GPS satellite database **220** includes combinations of satellite signals that are possible based on locations and/or combinations that are not possible based on locations. The combinations can be saved once calculated, in one case. Combinations, in some other cases, can be hardcoded to override a calculation.

The signal location analyzer **230**, of one embodiment, determines whether a combination of received signals are expected. Many different formulas or algorithms can support a heuristic approach to analysis of the combinations. A set of

rules can be coded into the signal location analyzer **230**, or a use interface can allow user control over the rules for analysis. Factors such as location, signal strength, and RSSI can be taken into account. For example, out of four identically powered satellites, the satellite that is furthest away in distance should not have the strongest RSSI. Another example anomaly is an unidentified satellite not found in the GPS satellite database **220**.

The quarantine module **240** takes ameliorative action against spurious signals from rogue devices. In one case, a drone can return to home. In another case, the drone can make an emergency landing. In still another case, the drone can destroy sensitive information. Other ameliorative actions include ignoring the spurious signal, using the last valid location, and reporting the rogue device. Various other actions can be utilized to prevent damage by the spurious signals.

Methods for UAV Navigation Security (FIGS. 3-5)

FIG. 3 is a high-level flow chart illustrating a method for determining validity of location signal combinations, according to an embodiment. One of ordinary skill in the art will recognize that the method **300** is non-limiting as other embodiments can have more or less steps and can be performed in a different order. The method **300** can be implemented in the system **100A** of FIGS. 1A,B or in other components.

A drone is pre-configured with a location device database and a flight path in preparation for an unmanned, autonomous flight (step **310**). The flight path can be configured, for example, using Google Maps to select a departure location and an arrival location for automatic routing. Also, a custom route can be selected by designating coordinates. Other flight characteristics can be programmed, such as flight speed, duration, and height at certain locations. In one embodiment, known locations for spurious signals and rogue devices are avoided. In another embodiment, previous successful flight paths and paths having strong or reliable location signals are preferred even if lengthening the flight path.

The drone navigates during the flight using the flight path and current location, as detected from satellites (step **320**). One preferred embodiment is triangulation, in which distances between a UAV and three different known locations intersect at the UAV location. The GPS satellite embodiment typically requires four different satellite locations out of 24 available. A single location can be used to derive a current location using distance along with a direction (e.g., 10 degrees east of north). Many other known location techniques can be substituted.

The integrity of the location information is also checked by analyzing combinations of received signals (step **330**), as discussed further in FIG. 4.

Upon detecting a spurious location signal, the drone quarantines the autonomous flight (step **340**), as detailed in FIG. 5.

FIG. 4 is a more detailed flow chart illustrating the step **330** of analyzing location signal combinations of the method **300** of FIG. 3, according to an embodiment.

Identifications are extracted from each of the received location signals (step **410**). Location information is derived from the identifications using a location device database (step **420**). For instance, a database query is formed from PRNs or SVNs to look up an associated location as a function of time. BSSIDs or cell tower locations are typically stationary, and thus, not a function of time, but can be in some implementations.

A list of possible combinations of location signals is compared against the received combination of location signals (step **430**). A set of rules, in an embodiment, can be applied against the combination to determine validity. Combinations can be explicit or calculated in real-time. In one case, an access point at a suspect location may not even be able to transmit over the calculated distance. In another case, yields a current location or a trajectory that is deemed not possible based on a rate of change from previous measurements. Some cases involve a time element, such as when a GPS satellite combination is not possible at a particular time, but may be possible at a different time. Other implementation-specific rules are possible.

If the received combination is not found, it is deemed as not possible and invalid (step **440**), otherwise it is deemed as possible and valid (**445**). Next, a spurious signal from the combination of received location signals is determined (step **450**).

FIG. 5 is a more detailed flow chart illustrating the step **340** of quarantining an autonomous UAV flight of the method **300** of FIG. 3, according to an embodiment. This embodiment of the quarantining step **340** takes progressively aggressive security actions. One of ordinary skill in the art, given the following description, will be able to tailor additional quarantine protocols within the spirit of the present disclosure.

The spurious signal is quarantined by ignoring associated location data when calculating further navigation data (step **510**) in order for a UAV to continue traveling to a destination (step **515**). The UAV can return to a previous location and effectively ignore the new location until valid location data is available. However, the spurious signal may represent a choke point at which additional navigation is not possible (step **520**), so the UAV can initialize a physical recovery routine, so the UAV itself is quarantined with a return to home or emergency landing navigation (step **525**). For example, rogue device may not only send invalid data, but may also suppress valid signals, leaving a hole in necessary data to determine location for further travel. Also, the previous location may be stale because too much distance or time has passed to be dependable. If the spurious signal has, however, resulted in an irretrievable UAV (step **530**), sensitive data can be deleted and/or the UAV can physically destroy itself with a crash landing or other technique (step **535**).

Additionally, spurious signals can be reported during or after flights. One embodiment continues gathers additional information about a rogue device with interrogation messages.

Generic Computing Device (FIG. 6)

FIG. 6 is a block diagram illustrating an exemplary computing device **600** for use in the system **100A** of FIG. 1, according to one embodiment. The computing device **600** is an exemplary device that is implementable for each of the components of the systems **100A** and **100B**, including the navigation security module **115** of FIG. 1. The computing device **600** can be a mobile computing device, a laptop device, a smartphone, a tablet device, a phablet device, a video game console, a personal computing device, a stationary computing device, a server blade, an Internet appliance, a virtual computing device, a distributed computing device, a cloud-based computing device, or any appropriate processor-driven device.

The computing device **600**, of the present embodiment, includes a memory **610**, a processor **620**, a storage drive **630**, and an I/O port **640**. Each of the components is coupled

for electronic communication via a bus **699**. Communication can be digital and/or analog, and use any suitable protocol.

The memory **610** further comprises network applications **612** and an operating system **614**. The network applications **612** can include the modules of the navigation security module **115**. Other network applications **612** can include a web browser, a mobile application, an application that uses networking, a remote application executing locally, a network protocol application, a network management application, a network routing application, or the like.

The operating system **614** can be one of the Microsoft Windows® family of operating systems (e.g., Windows 95, 98, ME, Windows NT, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows XP x64 Edition, Windows Vista, Windows CE, Windows Mobile, Windows 8 or Windows 10), Linux, HP-UX, UNIX, Sun OS, Solaris, Mac OS X, Alpha OS, AIX, IRIX62, or IRIX64. Other operating systems may be used. Microsoft Windows is a trademark of Microsoft Corporation.

The processor **620** can be a network processor (e.g., optimized for IEEE 802.11), a general purpose processor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a reduced instruction set controller (RISC) processor, an integrated circuit, or the like. Qualcomm Atheros, Broadcom Corporation, and Marvell Semiconductors manufacture processors that are optimized for IEEE 802.11 devices. The processor **620** can be single core, multiple core, or include more than one processing elements. The processor **620** can be disposed on silicon or any other suitable material. The processor **620** can receive and execute instructions and data stored in the memory **610** or the storage drive **630**.

The storage drive **630** can be any non-volatile type of storage such as a magnetic disc, EEPROM, Flash, or the like. The storage drive **630** stores code and data for applications.

The I/O port **640** further comprises a user interface **642** and a network interface **644**. The user interface **642** can output to a display device and receive input from, for example, a keyboard. The network interface **644** (e.g. RF antennae) connects to a medium such as Ethernet or Wi-Fi for data input and output.

Many of the functionalities described herein can be implemented with computer software, computer hardware, or a combination.

Computer software products (e.g., non-transitory computer products storing source code) may be written in any of various suitable programming languages, such as C, C++, C#, Oracle® Java, JavaScript, PHP, Python, Perl, Ruby, AJAX, and Adobe® Flash®. The computer software product may be an independent application with data input and data display modules. Alternatively, the computer software products may be classes that are instantiated as distributed objects. The computer software products may also be component software such as Java Beans (from Sun Microsystems) or Enterprise Java Beans (EJB from Sun Microsystems).

Furthermore, the computer that is running the previously mentioned computer software may be connected to a network and may interface to other computers using this network. The network may be on an intranet or the Internet, among others. The network may be a wired network (e.g., using copper), telephone network, packet network, an optical network (e.g., using optical fiber), or a wireless network, or any combination of these. For example, data and other information may be passed between the computer and components (or steps) of a system of the invention using a

wireless network using a protocol such as Wi-Fi (IEEE standards 802.11, 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11e, 802.11g, 802.11i, 802.11n, and 802.11ac, just to name a few examples). For example, signals from a computer may be transferred, at least in part, wirelessly to components or other computers.

In an embodiment, with a Web browser executing on a computer workstation system, a user accesses a system on the World Wide Web (WWW) through a network such as the Internet. The Web browser is used to download web pages or other content in various formats including HTML, XML, text, PDF, and postscript, and may be used to upload information to other parts of the system. The Web browser may use uniform resource identifiers (URLs) to identify resources on the Web and hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) in transferring files on the Web.

This description of the invention has been presented for the purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise form described, and many modifications and variations are possible in light of the teaching above. The embodiments were chosen and described in order to best explain the principles of the invention and its practical applications. This description will enable others skilled in the art to best utilize and practice the invention in various embodiments and with various modifications as are suited to a particular use. The scope of the invention is defined by the following claims.

We claim:

1. A computer-implemented method in an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for securing navigation of unmanned flights by validating combinations of Global Positioning System (GPS) location signals, the method comprising the steps of:

storing, in a memory device of the UAV, data about a database of GPS location devices comprising at least an identification and an expected location for each GPS location device;

receiving, in a signal receiver device of a UAV, a plurality of location GPS signals from a plurality of GPS location devices, during an autonomous UAV flight, wherein each of the plurality of received GPS location signals comprise at least an identification;

analyzing, by a processor of the UAV, a combination formed by the plurality of received GPS location signals to determine if the combination of received GPS location signals is possible based on expected locations of the GPS combination; and

responsive to the GPS combination of received GPS location signals being deemed as not possible, quarantining, by the processor, at least one of the plurality of received GPS location signals from the autonomous UAV flight.

2. The method of claim **1**, wherein:

the step of receiving comprises receiving the plurality of GPS location signals at a specific time, and wherein the step of analyzing comprises analyzing the combination formed by the plurality of received GPS location signals at the specific time.

3. The method of claim **1**, further comprising: determining that the at least one of the plurality of received GPS location signals comprises a spurious GPS location signal.

4. The method of claim **1**, further comprising: determining a current location or a current trajectory by triangulating location data of the combination of received GPS location signals.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising: storing route data for the autonomous UAV flight; and determining at least one navigation adjustment based on at least a current location or a current trajectory as determined from location data of the combination of received GPS location signals, relative to the route data.
6. The method of claim 1, further comprising: determining a current location from the combination of received GPS location signals; calculating a rate of change in location between the current location and at least one previous location; responsive to the rate of location change being above a predetermined threshold, quarantining at least one of the combination of received GPS location signals from the autonomous UAV flight.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the quarantining step comprises at least one of: quarantining the UAV from the at least one of the plurality of received GPS location signals, quarantining the UAV from the combination of received GPS location signals of the certain time, and quarantining the UAV from all received GPS location signals.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein: the step of analyzing comprises determining that at least one of the identifications of the received GPS location signals is invalid, and wherein the step of quarantining comprises quarantining the at least one of the plurality of received GPS location signals having the invalid identification.
9. The method of claim 1, further comprising: responsive to the combination of received GPS location signals being deemed as not possible, deleting a predetermined portion of data on a memory device of the UAV.
10. The method of claim 1, wherein the location signals comprise at least one of GPS signals, cellular signals, and Wi-Fi signals.
11. The method of claim 1, further comprising: responsive to the combination of GPS location signals being deemed as possible, continuing the autonomous UAV flight.
12. The method of claim 1, wherein the UAV comprises at least one of an aircraft, a drone, and a remote control (RC) airplane.
13. A non-transitory computer-readable medium, storing instructions that, when executed by a processor, perform a method in an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for securing navigation of unmanned flights by validating combinations of location signals, the method comprising the steps of: storing, in a memory device of the UAV, data about a database of Global Positioning System (GPS) location devices comprising at least an identification and an expected location for each location device; receiving, in a signal receiver device of a UAV, a plurality of location GPS signals from a plurality of GPS location devices, during an autonomous UAV flight, wherein each of the plurality of received GPS location signals comprise at least an identification; analyzing, by a processor of the UAV, a combination formed by the plurality of received GPS location signals to determine if the combination of received GPS location signals is possible based on expected locations of the GPS combination; and responsive to the GPS combination of received GPS location signals being deemed as not possible, quaran-

- ting, by the processor, at least one of the plurality of received GPS location signals from the autonomous UAV flight.
14. An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for securing navigation of unmanned flights by validating combinations of location signals, the UAV comprising: a memory device to store data about a database of Global Positioning System (GPS) location devices comprising at least an identification and an expected location for each GPS location device; a signal receiver device to receive a plurality of location signals from a plurality of GPS location devices, during an autonomous UAV flight, wherein each of the plurality of received GPS location signals comprise at least an identification; a processor to analyze a combination formed by the plurality of received GPS location signals to determine if the combination of received GPS location signals is possible based on expected locations of the combination, wherein responsive to the combination of received GPS location signals being deemed as not possible, the processor quarantines at least one of the plurality of received GPS location signals from the autonomous UAV flight.
15. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein the method further comprises: the step of receiving comprises receiving the plurality of GPS location signals at a specific time, and wherein the step of analyzing comprises analyzing the combination formed by the plurality of received GPS location signals at the specific time.
16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein the method further comprises: determining that the at least one of the plurality of received GPS location signals comprises a spurious location signal.
17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein the method further comprises: determining a current location or a current trajectory by triangulating location data of the combination of received GPS location signals.
18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein the method further comprises: storing route data for the autonomous UAV flight; and determining at least one navigation adjustment based on at least a current location or a current trajectory as determined from location data of the combination of received GPS location signals, relative to the route data.
19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein the method further comprises: determining a current location from the combination of received GPS location signals; calculating a rate of change in location between the current location and at least one previous location; responsive to the rate of location change being above a predetermined threshold, quarantining at least one of the combination of received GPS location signals from the autonomous UAV flight.
20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 13, wherein the quarantining step of the method further comprises at least one of:

quarantining the UAV from the at least one of the plurality
of received GPS location signals,
quarantining the UAV from the combination of received
GPS location signals of the certain time, and
quarantining the UAV from all received GPS location 5
signals.

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